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Explaining	the	uneven	demand	for	EU	parliamentary
oversight	during	the	Eurozone	crisis
The	Eurozone	crisis	increased	calls	for	institutional	reform	and	closer	parliamentary
oversight	of	the	EU’s	crisis	managers.	As	Federica	Genovese	and	Gerald	Schneider
show,	the	national	demand	for	increased	parliamentary	scrutiny	crucially	hinged	on	the
exposure	to	the	crisis	and	the	domestic	leeway	in	fighting	it.
A	frequent	phenomenon	in	times	of	economic	crisis	is	that	the	fight	between	contending
social	groups	over	who	should	shoulder	the	burden	of	adjustment	frequently	delays	necessary	reforms.	The	fear
that	the	complex	decision-making	apparatus	of	the	European	Union	would	prevent	the	organisation	from	finding
adequate	responses	to	the	Eurozone	crisis	was	particularly	pronounced.	To	the	surprise	of	some	Eurosceptic
predictions,	the	EU	was	able	to	agree	on	substantial	policy	reforms	in	the	midst	of	the	recent	economic	crisis.	What
allowed	for	these	responses?	Did	the	macroeconomic	features	and	set-up	of	the	Union	trigger	particular
parliamentary	action?	In	a	new	study	we	demonstrate	that	financial	crises	in	general,	and	the	Great	Recession	in
particular,	have	prompted	many	member	states	to	strengthen	parliamentary	oversight	through	the	empowerment	of
the	EU	affairs	committees	in	their	national	parliaments.
However,	the	demand	for	democratic	control	of	EU	affairs	is	uneven	across	the	supranational	organisation,	and	–
we	argue	–	is	a	function	of	their	embeddedness	in	the	Eurozone	and	the	debt	of	their	national	economy.	First,	the
abilities	of	member	states	belonging	to	the	Euro	area	and	those	staying	outside	the	Economic	and	Monetary	Union
(EMU)	in	fighting	the	crisis	fallout	differ	fundamentally,	as	non-EMU	member	states	can	use	both	monetary	and
fiscal	means	to	stimulate	the	economy.	Thus,	these	states	do	not	depend	on	supranational	crisis	management	in
times	of	crisis	and	their	demand	for	parliamentary	scrutiny	should	be	lower	than	for	those	states	that	are	part	of	the
Eurozone.	The	demand	for	increased	oversight	in	non-EMU	countries,	however,	increases	once	domestic	debt
constrains	the	sovereignty	in	responding	to	a	crisis,	making	the	outsider	more	dependent	on	the	decisions	made
within	the	Eurozone.	Economically	troubled	countries	within	the	Eurozone,	by	contrast,	would	not	increase	their
demand	for	further	parliamentary	scrutiny	in	times	of	crisis.
Using	data	on	parliamentary	scrutiny	across	Europe,	we	are	able	to	confirm	our	double	expectation	that	EMU
outsiders	are	less	likely	to	increase	the	monitoring	capacity	of	their	national	parliaments,	but	that	the	chance	of	a
further	empowerment	of	the	national	legislature	increases	with	growing	domestic	debt.	Figure	1	below	illustrates
how	selected	countries	have	strengthened	their	parliamentary	oversight	over	time.	France,	for	instance,
strengthened	its	oversight	mechanism	at	the	onset	of	the	crisis	while	heavily	indebted	Greece	refrained	from
empowering	its	national	legislature	further	during	the	same	period.	A	similar	difference	can	be	observed	between
the	Netherlands,	a	country	with	a	low	debt	level,	and	heavily	indebted	Belgium.	By	contrast,	the	non-EMU	Bulgaria
empowered	the	national	legislature	much	more	than	other	late-accession	EMU-insider	countries	like	Cyprus.
Figure	1:	Trends	on	the	adoption	of	EU	oversight	institutions	in	selected	countries
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Note:	Lines	are	the	country–specific	trends	on	Winzen’s	rescaled	institutional	oversight	index.	The	red	bar	indicates	the	beginning
of	the	Great	Recession	(2008)	that	led	to	the	Euro	crisis;	it	does	not	refer	to	country-specific	crises	(Bulgaria,	for	example,	did	not
undergo	a	crisis	according	to	Laeven	and	Valencia,	2012).
The	exposure	to	the	crisis	also	affects	how	parliaments	evaluate	the	crisis.	Here,	we	specifically	focus	on	EMU
debates	to	explain	their	discussions	on	EU	affairs	control.	We	argue	that	governments	try	to	keep	the	gates	closed
for	debates	about	parliamentary	sovereignty	at	the	height	of	the	crisis.	However,	if	they	cannot	prevent	a	debate,
members	of	the	parliament	will	demand	more	oversight	power	especially	if	the	country	is	heavily	indebted	and
therefore	at	risk	of	losing	its	governing	capacity.
We	selected	three	large	member	states	–	France,	Germany	and	Italy	–	and	examined	how	their	parliaments
debated	demands	for	more	parliamentary	oversight	in	relation	to	the	timing	of	the	Euro	crisis.	Figure	2	shows	that
the	monthly	difference	between	pro-	and	anti-scrutiny	words	varies	with	the	countries’	experience	of	the	crisis.
Significantly,	support	for	further	parliamentary	powers	decreased	with	the	intensification	of	the	economic	troubles.
In	2012,	when	the	crisis	was	at	its	climax,	the	support	for	increased	parliamentary	support	flattens	out.	Additionally,
the	pro-oversight	faction	is	more	active	in	the	Assemblée	Nationale,	the	national	legislature	of	the	less	debt-
constrained	France,	than	the	Parlamento	italiano.
Figure	2:	The	Great	Recession	and	Support	for	Scrutiny	of	EU	Institutions
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Note:	The	plot	shows	the	variation	of	pro-scrutiny	sentiment	as	recorded	in	the	collected	texts	of	the	French,	German	and	Italian
parliamentary	debates	(black	lines).	The	graph	also	shows	the	Greek	10-year	bond	yields	and	the	ECB	deposit	rate	as	the	two	main
indicators	of	the	Euro	crisis.
In	sum,	the	evidence	demonstrates	that	political	and	economic	interests	of	domestic	actors	have	shaped	the
legislative	response	to	the	Eurozone	crisis.	While	such	responses	are	probably	not	a	sufficient	antidote	against
Eurosceptic	populist	parties,	they	at	least	show	that	crises	can	strengthen	rather	than	weaken	democratic
institutions.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	The	Review	of	International	Organizations
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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